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SEXUAL VIOLENCE, MASCULINITY, AND AGENCY IN POST-SURRENDER JAPAN, 1945

Robert Kramm

In the immediate post-surrender period in late summer 1945, thousands of American servicemen entered Japan. Despite Japanese authorities' tactical planning of a "female floodwall" with brothels and other recreational facilities to distract the occupiers from the Japanese population, especially from Japanese women, and the occupiers' demonstration of military power, the first physical encounter of occupiers and occupied in the "militarized peace" of occupied Japan was nevertheless accompanied by violence—sexual violence in particular. Contrary to the often-ported peaceful image of the American occupation of Japan, this article highlights sex and violence as significant markers for the asymmetrical power relations during the occupation period. It analyzes the arena of sexual violence in which Japanese police officers and administrators, as well as Japanese civilians, struggled to prevent and control, but also to articulate and instrumentalize, the occupiers' sexual assaults.

Introduction

The occupation of Japan after World War II officially started on September 2, 1945. The exclusively male surrender ceremony, where officials signed the Instrument of Surrender, took place on the US battleship *Missouri* in Tokyo Bay. General Douglas MacArthur, acting Supreme Commander of the Allied Powers (SCAP), closed the ceremony with a speech addressing the hope for a peaceful future of Japan and stating that "a better world shall emerge out of the blood and carnage of the past—a world founded upon faith and understanding—a world dedicated to the dignity of man and the fulfillment of his most cherished wish—for freedom, tolerance and justice."¹ Despite such emphasis on reconciliation, the ceremony was a tremendous demonstration of power: one American flag on the *Missouri* was the same flag that flew over the White House on the day of the Pearl Harbor attack on December 7, 1941, and another one was the thirty-one star flag Commodore Matthew C. Perry used when he sailed to Japan in 1853 to "open" the country with gunboat diplomacy. During the ceremony, Allied warships crowded Tokyo Bay and planes filled the sky. After the ceremony ended, thousands of well-fed American soldiers and sailors disembarked on Japan's shores and advanced into the country where most people faced hunger in bombed-out cities.²

The waves of disembarking servicemen hit the newly built “female floodwall” (*onna no bōhatei*) in Japan’s major cities, and US servicemen patronized in large numbers the still rather scarce but strategically well-placed brothels. Following their defeat in the late summer of 1945, Japanese authorities in cooperation with private entrepreneurs of Japan’s entertainment industry initiated recreation facilities with brothels, cabarets, and nightclubs to “comfort” the Allied occupiers. Miyazawa Hamajirō, president of the state-supported Rest and Recreation Association (RAA), coined the term *floodwall* during his speech at the RAA’s inauguration ceremony in front of the Imperial Palace on August 28, 1945.³ Various studies have addressed the initiative to set up recreational facilities, some showing particular interest in the RAA, which was a right-wing, semi-governmental association meant to organize the postwar entertainment scheme. In her study, the historian Masayo Duus shows how high-ranking Japanese officials intervened by setting up prostitution as a protective zone between occupiers and occupied to secure Japan’s sovereignty and institutions after defeat—providing “gifts of the defeated” (*haisha no okurimono*), as Duus provocatively calls the sexual offerings.⁴ Japanese ideologues in politics and the entertainment business called these gifts “sacrifices” and deliberately exploited lower-class women to channel male sexual desires and interests; these women resembled colonial subjects forced to work in the wartime military comfort system.⁵ Historians of Japan’s infamous military comfort system argue that the whole concept of providing prostitution to the occupiers was a continuation of the wartime system.⁶ Others, including Sheldon Garon and Sarah Kovner, draw connections beyond the wartime period, highlighting the similarities between imperial Japan’s licensed prostitution system and the post-surrender prostitution scheme.⁷ In imperial Japan, as Fujima Yuki and Bill Mihalopolous have demonstrated, licensed prostitution was a key vehicle to establish the image of the lower-class sex worker whose labor was restricted to licensed brothels in designated red-light districts and with regular health examinations. This system secured middle- and upper-class women and their sexuality, which ultimately affirmed Japanese bourgeois identity and the state’s desire for national purity.⁸ Many accounts perpetuate a strong focus on male Japanese officials in politics, bureaucracy, and law being responsible for the conceptualization and organization of the postwar prostitution program; feminist studies often combine this with a demand for general prohibition of sex work and a critique of patriarchy.⁹

The various sexual encounters between occupation servicemen, civilian men, and women in military occupied countries and sex work in military occupations are obviously not limited to the occupation of Japan but have instead been an integral part of any modern military occupation.¹⁰ Regina Mühlhäuser meticulously reconstructs how sex was pivotal to the every-

day experiences of servicemen and civilians in the Nazi-occupied Soviet Union, ranging from romance and sexual services in exchange for pleasure or payment inside and outside military brothels to sexual violence in the way soldiers' used threats and physical force to coerce women into sex.¹¹ Military occupation also brought opportunities, which in the case of post-war occupied Germany enabled German women—through contacts with black and white US servicemen—to challenge established sexual boundaries and racial attitudes and allowed them to renegotiate their social position.¹² Modern military occupations around the world were nevertheless “littered with men and the spectre of masculinity,” to use the historian Glenda Sluga's words, creating and enforcing specific gendered and sexed encounters in the shadow of military bases.¹³ The most notorious encounters occurred due to the availability and maintenance of commercial sex—which the US military legitimated or at least tolerated for the sake of recreation, troop morale, and discipline—and reaffirmation of servicemen's masculinity.¹⁴ In post-surrender Japan, however, it was the defeated foe's authorities—not the occupying military, liberated people, or an authority-weary population—who facilitated sexual outlets for an opposing victorious army. Many occupation servicemen took advantage of their sexual opportunities in post-surrender Japan. They did not engage only with the women “provided” for them; some perceived all Japanese women as sexually available. Considering the US occupation of Japan as an instance of imperialism, as Mire Koikari convincingly stresses, GI's sexual behavior resembled that of many white men in colonial settings and often followed established racist images of the Japanese as a promiscuous, obedient, and sexually available Orientalized other.¹⁵

At first glance, it is remarkable how the first encounter between the occupiers and the occupied—both at the ceremony in Tokyo Bay and in organized brothels—was thoroughly planned by both American and Japanese authorities. Both, it seems, were eager to avoid more bloodshed after the war officially ended and tried to stimulate a transition from wartime antagonism to peaceful coexistence in the postwar era. Sex played a significant role in this first encounter and was arranged along heteronormative patterns. The occupiers performed a parade of their military, economic, and political power—in itself a sexualized performance of militaristic masculine power—and, despite official anti-fraternization policy and internal critique of the prevalence of commercial sex, the military command tolerated their personnel's sexual adventures in Japanese brothels.¹⁶ In the meantime, and under the careful watch of Japan's authorities, the RAA set up recreational facilities close to camps of the occupation forces.¹⁷

Yet things were more complicated than American and Japanese authorities anticipated. In order to shed light on the transition from war to peace

and underscore sex as a key aspect of it, this article assembles a variety of tragic testimonies of sexual violence outside of recreational facilities from the early occupation period in 1945. It deliberately focuses on the first weeks and months of the occupation, which have often been bypassed in the existing historiography.¹⁸ Many of imperial Japan's institutions, including the Home Ministry (*naimushō*), were still intact. In 1945, prostitution, believed by Japan's authorities to prevent sexual violence, differed from its forms in the later period of the occupation and was still more or less practiced along the model of imperial Japan's licensed prostitution system, which SCAP abolished in early 1946.¹⁹ In order to grasp the multiple experiences and dynamics of sexual violence, the historians Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke plead for a closer look at the practices and contexts of violence beyond meta-theoretical, political, and ideological claims.²⁰ The limited documentation of sexual violence in post-surrender Japan's police reports and bureaucratic memoranda offer some very limited insights into the agency of male perpetrators and female victims.²¹ Yet they illuminate in particular the efforts made by political, bureaucratic, and law enforcement agents of the Japanese state to prevent, control, and instrumentalize incidents of (sexual) violence. This article focuses on the male-dominated framing of sexual violence, e.g., how it was officially and unofficially ignored, sanctioned, or prosecuted and how it was spoken of or silenced.²² The analysis of sexual violence is thus not limited to the immediate perpetrators, victims, and the act of sexual assault. It rather addresses the complexity of sexual violence embedded into a wider scope of power relations.

Sexual violence in post-surrender Japan was closely entwined with a culture of what the political scientist Cynthia Enloe has labeled "militarized masculinity."²³ It sustains the image of the hyper-masculine soldier who is trained to follow orders, perpetrate physical violence, and sacrifice himself to protect his country and its families. He appears to be thus privileged to transgress boundaries—during wartime as well as in the postwar "militarized peace."²⁴ It is part of "what soldiers do," to quote the historian Marie Louise Roberts, yet the struggle over the management of sex and servicemen's sexual behavior is a struggle of authority that evolves in an arena encompassing servicemen and their sexual partners (or victims) as well as military authorities, local administrators, and civilian citizens.²⁵ Indeed, sexual violence in 1945 Japan, as it has been (and continues to be) the case elsewhere, constituted a hegemonic masculinity—not by the individual soldier dominating the bodies of occupied Japan's women alone but through the larger and flexible pattern in which sexual violence was practiced, spoken of, and silenced, involving male rivalry and competition as well as complicity.²⁶ In post-surrender Japan, Japanese male authorities—mainly police officers and bureaucrats of the Home Ministry—and sometimes

ordinary citizens developed strategies to limit, control, dodge, prevent, articulate, and instrumentalize sexual and other assaults by the American occupiers. Their practices, appropriations, and interpretations—their room to maneuver, also beyond discursive patterns—in the occupation's first days, weeks, and months are at the center of this article.

Reporting Sexual Assaults: Police Investigation, Racial Profiling, and Occupiers' Ignorance

The first officially reported postwar sexual assault in Japan occurred three days prior to the surrender ceremony. In a report, the Kanagawa Prefectural Police stated that at eleven in the morning on August 30, two US servicemen entered a Japanese house in Yokosuka. "Two American soldiers who were searching the neighborhood invaded the house, left it shortly for five minutes, and upon return one [soldier] forced [a] 36 year old women . . . to the small room next to the kitchen's entrance on the ground floor, the other [soldier] forced . . . [the woman's] 17 year old daughter . . . to the upper floor, both above mentioned [women] were threatened with drawn pistols and raped."²⁷ Another even more violent incident was reported the following day. In the early evening of September 1, two American soldiers drove around Yokohama City in a stolen truck and coerced two Japanese civilians to show them around the city. Later, they picked up 24-year-old Miss Y. at Eirakuchō, Naka Ward, and brought her to a US servicemen's dormitory in Noge-yama Park. At the dormitory, Miss Y. was gang raped by twenty-seven men, who violated her in turn until she lost consciousness. The next morning some servicemen cleaned and fed her and sent her home.²⁸

Historians of the occupation period have gathered 119 officially reported rape cases between September and October and counted 1,326 unofficially notified incidents of rape for the period between August 30 and September 10, 1945.²⁹ Although statistics indicate a certain decrease of sexual violence after the first few days of the occupiers' presence in Japan, a constant ratio of rape and attempted rape can still be found in American and Japanese police records throughout the occupation period.³⁰ These numbers, however, are only the officially notified incidents; the actual figures were presumably much higher. The existing official numbers nevertheless provide evidence that sexual assaults occurred despite the erection of the "female floodwall" and that both Japanese and American administrators kept records on the issue and were thus aware of sexual violence.

Incidents of sexual violence prompted Japanese authorities to develop various measures to limit and control assaults on Japanese citizens. Since Japan's law enforcement agencies had lost all jurisdiction to process crimes conducted by the occupiers as prescribed under occupation law, they could

mainly intervene by collecting information on crime cases and filing reports to occupation authorities for further investigation. On September 4, 1945, the Peace Preservation Section of the still-active Home Ministry released a directive to all major police departments nationwide, ordering them to report the occupiers' crimes—in particular sexual assaults.³¹ The section's members were apparently well aware that in American civil and military law sexual assault was illegal and considered the notification of occupation servicemen's illegal trespasses as the most effective means to limit crimes. Incidents could be reported at every police station and *kōban*, which were small police stations in Japanese neighborhoods that became popular starting in the mid-Meiji period where the police simultaneously maintained a high level of surveillance and interacted with citizens on a more personal and casual basis.³² The police forwarded the reports to the newly established Central Liaison Office (CLO), which was attached to Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and established to handle all communication between the Japanese government and SCAP's General Headquarters. In order to identify the perpetrators, the Peace Preservation Section advised the police to compile reports with as much detail as possible, for example noting the place and date of the crime as well as characteristics of the suspects. These included the name, age, appearance, "social status" (*mibun*), and military rank of the suspect.³³ In order to enable Japanese civilians to identify American military ranks, the newspaper *Asahi Shinbun* printed a short explanatory article with images of American military insignia the same day that the Home Ministry released its directive.³⁴

By looking at an array of the reports, however, it seems reasonable to believe that the criteria to identify suspects as proposed by the Home Ministry's Peace Preservation Section were mainly pointing to bodily features and such vague classifications as "social status" can rather be read as racial categorizations. A memorandum submitted by the CLO on October 12, 1945, for instance, reported that at "about 11 p.m. September 19, three United States negro soldiers stationed in the area of Iwaimachi, Hodogayaku, forced their way into the home of . . . a conscripted Japanese soldier. One of the negro soldiers was posted outside as a lookout. The other two going inside while holding a jack knife demanded sexual intercourse with [the] wife of the Japanese soldier. [She] ran outside but was caught by the other negro soldier who was stationed outside. She was then dragged to the bushes and raped by the three negro soldiers. Three other negro soldiers passing there also assaulted her."³⁵

Next to place and time, the term "negro soldier" is the only explicit description of the suspects stated in the CLO report, and such other features as military insignia or personal appearance are not mentioned. Compared to similar reports, it seems conspicuous that "negro," and occasionally

"coloured," were generally used as umbrella terms to categorize nonwhite servicemen. Although it is hard to prove any racist sentiments of the CLO or the reporting Japanese police, racial categorizations or even racial profiling appear as returning tropes in the reports.³⁶ This is particularly apparent in the reversed case, when skin color was totally absent in a report about crimes apparently committed by white servicemen. Against the backdrop of a common anti-black racism in Japan that saw black males as violent, hyper-sexualized, and sexually insatiable, it sustains the notion that Japan's authorities used "negro" and "coloured" in their reports as markers to emphasize the overall gravity of the threat posed by sexual violence committed by American servicemen.³⁷

Starting in mid-September 1945, the CLO submitted almost daily crime reports to SCAP's General Headquarters. In one of the first reports from September 19, the CLO listed all incidents between August 31 and September 5 in a twenty-one page memorandum, covering burglary, robbery, death resulting from traffic accidents, attempted rape, and one abduction with rape in Miura, Kanagawa prefecture.³⁸ Stolen goods were mostly cars or trucks, watches, money, Japanese swords, clothes (kimonos), or food and alcohol. Stolen vehicles were often used for such crimes as kidnapping, stealing large amounts of alcohol, or committing a series of burglaries. On September 10, for example, the CLO reported that three American soldiers had been driving around in "a car belonging to the Meguro Second Office of the Yamato Motor Car Company situated in Shimizu-machi, Meguro-ku." According to the report, the soldiers went on a "spree" with the car and forced its chauffeur, Unichiro Shishido, to accompany them. Unichiro later reported to the police that the three soldiers would have committed "about thirty cases of burglary and threat" and, in the evening, invited "Geisha girls and passed their pleasant time until the small hours of the next day." Upon questioning by the police, the "Geisha girls" also attested that the three soldiers were handling various stolen items they had obtained that night, including several watches and Japanese yen notes.³⁹

A public display of criminal activities was not uncommon, and many American servicemen made no significant attempt to cover up their criminal activities. Some servicemen even blatantly showed off their intentions. A certain "G.I. Jopha," for instance, stopped a Japanese truck driver somewhere in the Tokyo-Yokohama area on September 19, took his vehicle, and left an "obligation letter" that said:

One car (Buick) Model '1930'.

To be used by the U.S.Gov. for purpose of transporting high ranking officers on official business. After all who won the war, you or me? This certified that this car is to be used to pick up any girls

who fuck, and further more who cares what the hell is it to you.
G. I. Jopha [signed]
17-fort soldiers of the winning army, U.S.A.
on this date 19. Sept. 1945.⁴⁰

Such statements demonstrate US servicemen's superior attitude in occupied Japan. Especially in the first few weeks before the whole bureaucratic apparatus of the occupation regime was established, occupation force personnel appeared to be under no strict regimentation. This translated into the criminal behavior of some servicemen, for whom occupied Japan offered many opportunities, especially selling military goods on the black market.⁴¹ The dimension of sex in the above-cited reports is particularly noticeable, and the references to a night out with "geisha girls" and the truck that is "to be used to pick up any girls who fuck" substantiate the impression of American servicemen seeking sexual adventures and exploiting opportunities in occupied Japan.

As many of the filed reports indicate, most sexual assaults were carried out along similar patterns. The historian Tanaka Yuki argues that many servicemen pretended to patrol Japanese neighborhoods in search of accessible women and entered civilian houses while family members were asleep or at work. In addition, rape or attempted rape often followed the distribution of food or other goods. On many occasions, servicemen offered chocolate, cigarettes, or money in exchange for sexual services. Upon rejection, however, perpetrators often forced women into sexual intercourse by beating them or holding them at gunpoint.⁴² Tanaka echoes the Home Ministry's Peace Preservation Section's evaluation in September 1945. The ministry's analysis and suggestions were explicated in a memorandum about two rape cases in Yokosuka and Tateyama that both occurred on September 2, 1945. In the first case in Yokosuka, two sailors of the US Navy acted as if they were inspecting the neighborhood. According to the memo, the sailors were purposely cruising the area at midday when most men were at work and the women were home alone. After they entered a house, they apparently communicated through unmistakable gestures that they were seeking sexual intercourse and even offered payment. After the women rejected the proposal, the sailors drew their pistols and forced the women to have sex. In Tateyama, Chiba prefecture, two soldiers of the US Eighth Army acted quite similarly. In this case, the memo concluded, it became apparent that the soldiers knowingly acted against the law because they tried to rape the women "in secret" (*hisoka ni*) and always posted one man outside as lookout (*mihari ni tatsu*).⁴³

The occupiers' responses to the numerous reports were rather sobering and probably disappointing for Japanese authorities—as well as insulting

for the victims of sexual assault. SCAP's reaction was usually to demand more detailed evidence for the reported crimes and to state that the scarce information on the suspects provided by Japan's authorities would not be sufficient for further investigation. Quite often occupation authorities stated that the victims and witnesses should give more comprehensive testimonies and accurate descriptions of the suspected perpetrators, who would be easy to identify due to their uniform and military insignia.⁴⁴ As Sarah Kovner demonstrates on the basis of statistics compiled in 1950 by the Far East Command (FEC), throughout the occupation period a discrepancy existed between rape cases reported and those cases investigated and put to trial. Four hundred and twenty-two servicemen got arrested on rape charges between 1947 and 1949, but only 104 were court martialed, and only 53 were convicted.⁴⁵ SCAP also responded to newspaper articles, which addressed sexual assaults and other crimes against Japanese civilians committed by occupation personnel. On September 19, 1945, SCAP released a press code that prohibited, among other things, criticizing SCAP, its policies, and personnel. Among the press code's censor catalogue, reports on harassments, assaults, and other crimes committed by American soldiers and sailors were also considered a direct critique of the occupation and the occupiers and thus not allowed for publication.⁴⁶ Suspending or even rejecting investigations due to alleged lack of information and releasing the press code to censor news reports on servicemen's crimes were significant attempts by the occupation regime to officially silence discussions of sexual violence in occupied Japan.

Preventing Sexual Assaults I: Police Agency and its Limits

The Japanese police were in an ambivalent position in post-surrender Japan. As an integral institution within Japan's defeated imperial state, the police had lost much of their sovereignty as the legitimate executor of the state's monopoly on physical force. The Japanese police had no right to intervene or even investigate crimes committed by members of the occupation regime. And they had no jurisdiction for crimes committed within the premises of the occupation army's bases—including black marketeering of US army supplies and assaults on Japanese civilians working for Americans in jobs like translators, typists, caretakers, and cooks. In the early days and weeks of the occupation period, much of the police work concerning the occupiers was thus limited to paperwork, and police officers gathered information, secured evidence, and filed reports. The police were nevertheless obligated to enforce Japanese law and maintain order among Japanese citizens. The Home Ministry directly ordered all police units to endure defeat by memorizing the emperor's call for a "grand peace for all the generations

to come" (*bansei ni taihei o hirakamu*), which was part of Hirohito's surrender speech broadcast on the radio on August 15, but also to maintain "pride" (*kinji*) in their work as representatives of the Japanese people. In addition, the police were told to embody such values as "open-heartedness" (*kyoshin*), a "kindly, cordial manner" (*konsetsu*), and "speedy management" (*jinsoku shori*).⁴⁷ Hence, during the first encounters of the early occupation period, the Japanese police were challenged to engage with Japanese civilians on the one hand and servicemen of the occupation forces on the other but not to actively investigate crimes involving both groups.

One of the police's efforts to maintain public order without interfering with the occupiers was to control red-light districts according to police guidelines developed in imperial Japan. In Yokohama, for instance, the local police had trouble maintaining public order in and around the brothel *Goraku-sō*, which the police had organized. The facility was overcrowded with thousands of servicemen who often fought among themselves over the few sex workers at the brothel. Drunkenness apparently facilitated reoccurring brawls within the *Goraku-sō's* premises and riots in the neighborhood. The Kanagawa Prefectural Police Department thus decided to shut down the *Goraku-sō*, arguing that the police could not control the situation and would be unable to guarantee public security.⁴⁸ Compared to other brothels like the RAA-run *Komachien* in Ōmori, which was frequented as much as the *Goraku-sō* but with fewer fights and unrest within the surrounding neighborhood, it is apparent that the police's interest in maintaining public security was only focused on the quarrels outside the brothel. The police mostly ignored the harassments and sexual assaults against the lower-class sex workers within the servicemen-centered entertainment facilities.⁴⁹

In line with RAA ideology of separating "chaste" women from those who would be willing to service the victors, the police also tried to maintain public morality and control the finances of the privately and RAA-managed prostitution businesses. On October 3, 1945, the director of the police's economic crime section addressed all subdivisions of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department on his section's concerns about the threat for public morality resulting from the illegal recruitment of women for sex work. The critique mainly pointed out the vague recruitment ads of the RAA, which did not clearly state the exact nature of the advertised jobs. Labor brokers in particular, who recruited young women in the countryside for brothels in the cities, were criticized for being ruthless. The economic crime section also developed a form sheet entitled "*shinchūgun yūkyō ryōkin seikyūsho*," which was meant to be an income receipt for sexual services provided to the occupying forces (*shinchūgun*). The section's intent was to make it compulsory for brothel owners and sex workers to declare one's name and address, as well as exact date, number of customers, and hours and rates of service. On

the one hand, the receipt was foremost meant as a labor and tax certificate. On the other hand, the data gained through the service declaration enabled the police to obtain more detailed information on the prostitution business and insights into specific brothels.⁵⁰

In contrast to the Kanagawa police, the Section for Public Morals (*fūki kakari*) of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police Department positively evaluated the presence of occupation servicemen, claiming they were no potential threat and would not endanger public security. In a memorandum to the Home Ministry, the Section for Public Morals reported increasing numbers of customers in entertainment facilities who they described with the rather euphemistic term “reveler” (*yūkyōsha*). Although the increase of such “revelers” might result in possible incidents of petty crime, including theft of kimonos or money from the brothel’s cashier, the authors of the memorandum did not speak of an overall negative effect on the general public. Rather, the authors believed, all people working in certain establishments needed to watch out and be a bit more careful to avoid minor incidents. What is distinct in this report is the authors’ emphasis on the cooperation between local police units and the US military police. Together they started to patrol red-light districts and control brothels in various places in Tokyo. According to the Section for Public Morals, Japanese police officers also collaboratively engaged in public health inspections, which were in this report conducted on September 20, 1945, due to the worries (*shinpai*) of a US military surgeon about widespread “virus contamination” (*byōdoku osen*). Apparently, of forty-two diagnosed sex workers—the report’s authors called them *settaifu*—six had syphilis.⁵¹

According to the terminology, the Section for Public Morals’ authors seemed to be convinced that the Japanese police were able to sufficiently control post-surrender Japan’s entertainment facilities. Certain expressions and activities mentioned in the report underscore the police’s longer history and internalized responsibility of controlling red-light districts. The labels *yūkyōsha* and *settaifu* were most likely nostalgic references to clients and “welcoming” or servicing women in the old pleasure quarters (*yūkaku*) of the Tokogawa period. The public health inspections of brothels and sex workers had been part of certain police duties since the early Meiji period.⁵²

Although the report signifies police officers’ pride and self-assurance in their work, it cannot hide the dependency of the Japanese police on the occupiers’ military police. Crimes evidently committed by members of the occupation forces could usually only be stopped and investigated by Japanese police officers with the help of the US military police. A CLO report from September 10, 1945, for example, states, “On September 9, around 5:25 p.m. two American soldiers broke into the house of [a man in] Yokosuka City and attempted to rape his 48 year old wife, after giving her a handkerchief.

While her husband appeared from the inner room in response to her call for help, one of the American soldiers struck him with a fist. They decamped without accomplishing their object. On receiving report from policemen stationed near the scene of the incident, the Foreign office lost no time in communicating the matter to the U.S. Gendarmerie, which immediately arrested the American soldiers."⁵³ Several days later in the Yokohama area, the local Japanese police officers had to rely on the nearby US military police: "[A] 55 year old mother was walking [on a] road [in] Totsukamachi, Totsuka Ward at about 9:40 p.m. September 14 together with her two daughters, 26 years old, and 23 years old. They were stopped by four American troops at the point of pistols. The Americans took away the two daughters. The Totsuka Police, upon receipt the report of the kidnapping by the mother, immediately sent a message to Sub-Lieutenant Witson, American M.P., and started to search of the kidnapped girls. They were found taking refuge in a nearby civilian house and escaped raping."⁵⁴

Many of the CLO's reports reveal that it was not only the crimes of servicemen against Japanese civilians that caused the police trouble—direct attacks on Japanese police officers themselves rendered them helpless against servicemen's assaults. Police officers' swords were popular trophies for American soldiers and sailors. Sometimes, as an incident on September 19, 1945, shows, servicemen openly ridiculed and undermined Japanese police officers' authority: "About 9:30 am September 5th, one American officer with 3 negro soldiers came to the garage of the Ooka Police bureau, located at 1, 184, Ooka-machi, Minami-ku, Yokohama, and seized a Chevrolet. . . . In committing this action, they handed a piece of paper to Police [Officer] Saiki, on which was written 'Dollar.'"⁵⁵ Other reports reveal more violent assaults on Japanese police officers. On November 24, the police officer K. Shigeru patrolled in Yokosuka and "was demanded money by two American sailors. When he refused, he was fired by their revolvers and received injuries in his abdomen. He was immediately carried to a hospital in the neighborhood and given medical treatment but died at 9 p.m. the following day."⁵⁶

The helplessness of Japanese police officers vis-à-vis the occupiers manifested itself especially in the limited authority to directly intervene or investigate crimes committed by servicemen. The only opportunities seemed to be to secure evidence, note testimonies of victims and witnesses, and assist the US military police. However, as the CLO reports indicate, rape and other assaults were usually only properly investigated and prosecuted if the perpetrator was caught in the act.⁵⁷ Japanese police officers therefore shared a certain helplessness with the overall Japanese population. The balance of power between Japanese police and civilians, however, hardly changed. As the historian Christopher Aldous notes, the Japanese popula-

tion in the postwar period was still confronted with the police's interference in every aspect of daily life like in the wartime and prewar period. This included neighborhood surveillance, random identification, and personal surveys on households, which were justified as crime investigation and prevention.⁵⁸ Thus, regardless of the loss of authority by the Japanese police in early occupied Japan, the police were still keen on maintaining control over the Japanese population. Although they had to cede their authority to Americans and could only intervene depending on the occupiers' military police, the Japanese police continued to enforce Japanese law among Japanese citizens and kept patrolling neighborhoods, checking communities, and inspecting brothels.

Preventing Sexual Assaults II: State Propaganda and Civilian Efforts

In addition to filing reports and attempting to maintain public order, Japan's authorities also tried to actively mobilize Japanese civilians in efforts to avoid and prevent sexual assaults against Japanese women. The Home Ministry asked Japanese citizens to report any crimes at local police stations, and newspapers circulated articles to inform the public of US military insignias in order to identify perpetrators. The Home Ministry's Peace Preservation Section released additional guidelines to prevent crime and assaults that the police were meant to disseminate among the Japanese populace. The ministry advocated for Japanese women to always be accompanied by a man, or better yet, remain at home. Their recommendations also reverberated through newspaper articles from late August 1945 that advised Japanese women and children not to go out alone and refrain from wearing "licentious clothes."⁵⁹ Authorities even considered prohibiting women and children from going outside the house at night altogether. Such paternalism also extended to dress codes, and the ministry encouraged neighborhood associations to advise their female residents to take special precautions by wearing their wartime work dress called *monpe* with several layers of underwear to protect themselves against sexual assaults and not to expose any female body shape. Drawing on wartime propaganda, the ministry encouraged assistance among community members and the "spiritual" strengthening of women. Women were told to call out loudly for help in the case of an emergency and assemble nearby residents to act in "collective defense" (*kyōdō bōei*) against offenders. To do so, women in particular would need to receive adequate "spiritual education" (*seishin kyōiku*) to be prepared for sexual assaults. To be able to call for help and gather in defensive crowds, however, would not cover all aspects necessary for women's spiritual strength. Women were furthermore asked not to be

passive in the case of a sexual assault but to protest and resist rape as strongly and violently as possible “to protect female chastity” (*teisō o mamoru*). After a sexual assault, women needed to have the courage to report to the police so that Japan’s authorities could forward the information to the occupiers for further investigation.⁶⁰

It is almost impossible to prove whether Japanese civilians actually behaved according to the Home Ministry’s guidelines or if these guidelines were even disseminated publicly. Some of the ministry’s suggested modes of behavior did, however, surface in CLO reports on sexual assaults. The recommendation for rape victims to scream and call for help, for instance, helped three women in Yokohama escape being raped. According to a report, “at about 11 p.m. on September 13, one American negro troop invaded [a woman’s] home [in] Nishi Ward. The negro troop tried to rape her by pushing her throat, but fled away when she screamed loudly.”⁶¹ On the same day, just a few blocks away, it was reported that “two American negro troops invaded the house of [a Japanese mother in] Nishi Ward, at about 11:40 p.m. September 13. They attempted to rape [her] and her son’s wife . . . but fled away when the two screamed loudly.”⁶² The ministry’s gender-biased evaluation that male presence would limit sexual assaults against women, however, usually misjudged the situation and did not help the victims. On many occasions, husbands and other male relatives or friends present were chained, hit, or had a gun pointed at them, while the wife, daughter, or sister was kidnapped, raped, or otherwise assaulted. In Yokohama on September 4, for example, a report stated that “4 American soldiers went into the house of . . . a laborer, and forced at the point of gun his wife, . . . to come outside with them, and were about to kidnap her in a Datsun on which they came, but she managed to escape by running away from them.”⁶³ On the same day on Miura peninsula close to Yokosuka, a report noted that “American soldiers, riding in a motor car, stopped at the Nagai Village, Mura-gun to force [a 51 year old man from Yokosuka] . . . and his companion, wife of [a 27 or 28 year old Japanese male] into the car, they soon discarded the man, and kidnapped the girl.”⁶⁴

According to a variety of the reports filed by the CLO, Japanese civilians sometimes reacted against sexual assaults as recommended by the Home Ministry. This is not to say that the ministry’s guidelines were realized or applied. Rather, the reported actions of Japanese civilians hint at the agency of sexually targeted women, relatives, friends, neighborhood associates, and Japanese police officers, who all left traces in the CLO reports of their practices in preventing, dodging, and resisting sexual assaults. Screaming and running away were the most common practices, but others developed strategies that could be similarly effective to avoid being raped. In a report from Yokohama, for instance, a CLO administrator recorded that

on September 15, about 9:30 p.m., two American soldiers entered into the home of [a Japanese family in] Fujisawa City. While the father entertained the American soldiers, the mother fled outside. [The daughter] was taking a bath quickly concealed herself with the lid of the bath and so was not discovered. Again on September 16, about 1:30 a.m., two American soldiers forced the way into the home. [The daughter] and her mother who were sleeping inside a mosquito-net were discovered when the pocket flashlight of an American soldier was flashed on them. The mother fled outside through the front door but [the daughter] attempting to escape through the window was captured by three American soldiers posted at the back door. [The daughter] yelled out and she was hit in the face. The American soldiers attempting to rape her, ripped off her clothes. But they were frustrated in their attempt as police officers and men who were informed by the mother came running toward the house. The American soldiers escaped.⁶⁵

The same report noted that two days later, "during the absence of [a Japanese male in] Kooza-gun, on September 17, an American soldier under the pretense that he desired a Japanese flag, approached the Japanese home and seeing that not a man was around tried to force himself upon the wife, . . . 34 years old. However, she cried out the MP is coming which scared the American soldier away."⁶⁶

In the first case, the help of police officers and other men in the neighborhood, who were informed by the escaped mother, apparently "frustrated" and chased off the group of American servicemen. In the second case, the rapist was "scared away" by shouting that the military police were coming. Both cases highlight the importance of what the historian Shani D'Cruze has called the "informal strategies" employed by rape victims to gain support from friends, family members, or neighbors, which often bypassed such law-enforcing and legal institutions as police and courts.⁶⁷ In post-surrender Japan, collaborations between victims, relatives, neighbors, and official agents of the Japanese state and the American military police sometimes helped prevent sexual assaults. Although it is important to note that the physical or imaginative presence of the occupation authorities—embodied in this case by the military police—was significant in the prevention and investigation of sexual assaults, the interventions by Japanese police officers as well as the recommendations envisioned by the Home Ministry and the strategies developed and exercised by Japanese civilians were also effective measures to prevent sexual assaults.

Male Complicities: Sexual Violence, Patriarchal Power, and Silencing

Sexual violence in post-surrender Japan occurred within a pervasive culture of militarized masculinity. This enabled the conceptualization and organization of a “female floodwall” that exploited lower-class sex workers to comfort the invading foreign soldiers. Occupation army servicemen themselves engaged with Japanese sex workers and coerced women who were not sex workers by force or threat to have sex. Japanese authorities attempted to limit these sexual assaults committed by occupation personnel, although not very successfully. The occupiers’ usual response to proposed cases was to ask for more information on accused suspects in order to start further investigation, which was part of their strategy to suppress news, reports, and investigations of sexual assault incidents. Servicemen themselves seem to have followed a culture of silence and did not denounce fellow soldiers, as is evident in the gang-rape incident in Nogeyama Park.⁶⁸

The sexual encounter between occupiers and occupied appears to have followed a clear-cut divide of American servicemen as perpetrators and Japanese women as victims of sexual violence, while Japan’s authorities were rather helpless spectators. There is evidence, however, that Japanese men were complicit in exploiting Japanese women’s experiences of sexual violence. Male hegemony did not stop with the violent physical practices of harassing, assaulting, raping, and pimping women. Although nothing exceeds the pain and suffering that the victims of sexual violence experienced, the subsequent use of the victims’ experiences by Japan’s authorities illuminates the wide range of masculine power relations. Based on the sources at hand, which are predominantly police and CLO reports, it is obvious that victims of sexual violence were overpowered multiple times.⁶⁹ Japan’s authorities urged women to report sexual assaults and even advised special “spiritual education” to strengthen women to testifying. They thus forced women to express their experience of sexual violence in male-dominated arenas, and police reports and ministry memoranda framed women’s voices. Victims were unable to articulate their individual experiences on their own terms. In addition, sexual assault cases were hardly ever prosecuted, and courts rarely convicted perpetrators.

Female victims of sexual violence in post-surrender Japan often experienced what the philosopher and literary critic Gayatri Spivak calls “epistemic violence.”⁷⁰ Male-dominated discourse reduced the individual tragic and painful experience of sexual violence to male interest. Male advocacy embedded rape and other assaults against Japanese women into a narrative of the violation of Japan’s women by the raging occupiers; it was dominated by a male understanding of what sexual violence is and

how it can be articulated—ignoring the experiences of the lower-class sex workers who were supposed to protect all other Japanese women. Using the trope of the vulnerable, violated, yet nationally significant body of the Japanese woman, male Japanese police officers, bureaucrats, and politicians deliberately exploited the tragedies of rape victims to position themselves opposite the occupiers. It helped male Japanese authorities legitimate the existence of the “female floodwall,” sometimes even proclaiming that the number of brothels and sex workers was not sufficient to protect all Japanese women. It simultaneously enabled their attempts to resist or undermine the occupiers’ very concept of modernity and democracy by pointing out the trespasses of occupation personnel. This, ultimately, allowed Japanese men, and in particular male agents of the Japanese state, to satisfy their own masculine nationalist desires and attempts to maintain authority in immediate postwar Japan.

Conclusion

As MacArthur announced in his speech on the deck of the *Missouri*, the occupation’s goal was a peaceful Japan within a “better world” based on “freedom, tolerance and justice.” In a broad perspective, as the historians John Dower and Takemae Eiji convincingly argue, these goals were accomplished because in the second half of the twentieth century, Japan no longer posed an immediate military threat.⁷¹ The occupation of Japan was nevertheless more than a mere lesson in American-style democracy, and the anticipated transition from warfare to peaceful liberation was far from smooth according to either American or Japanese plans. The first encounter between occupiers and occupied was not entirely harmonious and a lot of tension existed between them—a tension that surfaced in physical and sexual violence. The occupiers’ praise of democracy did not prevent servicemen of the occupation army from attacking and molesting Japanese civilians. For women in particular—who were the predominant targets of sexual violence—it is thus questionable if September 2, 1945, actually marks the groundbreaking beginning of freedom and peace as proposed by MacArthur or if it brought a new type of conflict to their doorsteps.⁷²

In post-surrender Japan, incidents of sexual violence and the way they were (or were not) spoken of uncovers how the asymmetrical power relations between occupiers and occupied was often reflected in sexual relations during the transition from war to peace. It highlights the intersection of sexuality with race, class, and gender in the efforts to control sexual encounters and the discursive patterns in which sexual violence could be articulated and silenced. Japanese men and women were not systematically mass raped, but the many forms of sexual violence were not singular

instances of servicemen's individual misconduct either. A hegemonic masculinity framed the incidents' significance, depriving the victims of their interpretation of their experience. Male authorities, both occupiers and occupied, instrumentalized sexual violence either by being silent about it and not seriously attempting to prosecute perpetrators or by appropriating it for self-victimization and empowerment to satisfy nationalistic desires. Looking at sexual violence, however, also offers a way to reconstruct agency in 1945 Japan, particularly in terms of Japanese officials' room to maneuver. They were not passive spectators of occupation policy but actively engaged in the attempt to maintain masculine authority after Japan's masculinity had failed with defeat and surrender in World War II.

NOTES

¹Douglas MacArthur, *Reminiscences* (New York: Fawcett World Library, 1964), 314–15.

²John W. Dower, *Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1999), 40–43.

³Rest and Recreation Association (RAA), "Tokushu ianshisestu kyōkai seimeisho," in *Nihon fujin mondai shiryō shūsei*, vol. 1, ed. Fusae Ichikawa (Tokyo: Domesu Shuppan, 1978), 536–37. See also Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, chap. 4, on the term *female floodwall* and how it was contemporarily used; for how it evolved as a metaphor in postwar Japanese literary narratives, see Michael Molasky, *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa: Literature and Memory* (New York: Routledge, 1999), chap. 4.

⁴Masayo Duus, *Haisha no okurimono: Tokushu ian shisetsu RAA o meguru senryōshi no sokumen* (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 1985), 76; and Setsuko Inoue, *Senryōgun ianjo: Kokka ni yoru baishun shisetsu* (Tokyo: Shinhyōron, 1995), 12.

⁵Meiko Yamada, *Senryōgun ianfu: Kokusaku baishun no onnatachi no higeki* (Tokyo: Kōjinsha, 1992), 8; and Molasky, *The American Occupation of Japan and Okinawa*, 105.

⁶Yuki Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery and Prostitution during World War II and the US Occupation* (London: Routledge, 2002), 147; Yoshimi Yoshiaki, *Comfort Women: Sexual Slavery in the Japanese Military during World War II* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000), 180, 185–89; and John Lie, "The State as Pimp: Prostitution and the Patriarchal State in Japan in the 1940s," *The Sociological Quarterly* 38, no. 2 (1997): 251–63.

⁷Sheldon Garon, "The World's Oldest Debate? Prostitution and the State in Imperial Japan, 1900–1945," *American Historical Review* 98, no. 3 (1993): 710–32; and Sarah Kovner, *Occupying Power: Sex Workers and Servicemen in Postwar Japan* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2012).

⁸Yuki Fujime, *Sei no rekishi gaku: kōshō seido, daitaiza taisei kara baishun bōshihō, yūsei hogohō taisei e* (Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 1997), 32–33; and Bill Mihalopoulos, *Sex in Japan's Globalization, 1870–1930: Prostitutes, Emigration, and Nation-Building* (London: Pickering & Chatto, 2011), 129.

⁹Yuki Fujime, "Japanese Feminism and Commercialized Sex: The Union of Militarism and Prohibitionism," *Social Science Japan Journal* 9, no. 1 (2006): 33–50; and Kazuko Hirai, "Nihon senryō o 'sei' de minaosu," *Nihonshi Kenkyū* 500 (2004): 107–30, 130.

¹⁰Cynthia Enloe, *Maneuvers: The International Politics of Militarizing Women's Lives* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2000), 51.

¹¹Regina Mühlhäuser, *Eroberungen: Sexuelle Gewalttaten und intime Beziehungen deutscher Soldaten in der Sowjetunion, 1941–1945* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2010), 30.

¹²Maria Höhn, *GIs and Fräuleins: The German-American Encounter in 1950s West Germany* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 12; and Annette Brauerloch, *Fäuleins und GIs: Geschichte und Filmgeschichte* (Frankfurt am Main: Stroemfeld Verlag, 2006), 10.

¹³Glenda Sluga, "Masculinities, Nations, and the New World Order: Peacemaking and Nationality in Britain, France, and the United States after the First World War," in *Masculinities in Politics and War: Gendering Modern History*, ed. Stefan Dudink, Karen Hagemann, and Josh Tosh (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), 238–54, 238. This might obscure the fact, however, that women were vital agents to sustain military occupations. Christine de Matos and Rowena Ward, "Analyzing Gendered Occupation Power," in *Gender, Power, and Military Occupations: Asia Pacific and the Middle East since 1945* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 1–19, 1. The figure of the shadow that US military installations cast is borrowed from Ji-Yeon Yuh, *Beyond the Shadow of Camp Town: Korean Military Brides in America* (New York: New York University Press, 2004).

¹⁴Maria Höhn and Seungsook Moon, eds., *Over There: Living with the U.S. Military Empire from World War Two to the Present* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Beth Bailey and David Farber, *First Strange Place: Race and Sex in World War II Hawaii* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992); and Saundra Pollock Sturdevant and Brenda Stoltzfus, eds., *Let the Good Times Roll: Prostitution and the U.S. Military in Asia* (New York: New Press, 1992).

¹⁵Mire Koikari, "Gender, Power, and U.S. Imperialism: The Occupation of Japan, 1945–1952," in *Bodies in Contact: Rethinking Colonial Encounters in World History*, ed. Tony Ballantine and Antoinette Burton (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2005), 342–62, 345; and Anne McClintock, *Imperial Leather: Race, Gender, and Sexuality in the Colonial Contest* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 21–22. On racist American imagery of Japan, see John W. Dower, *War without Mercy: Race and Power in the Pacific War* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1986).

¹⁶Sebastian Jobs, *Welcome Home Boys! Military Victory Parades in New York City 1899–1946* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2012), 34; Naoko Shibusawa, *America's*

Geisha Ally: Reimagining the Japanese Enemy (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006); and Mire Koikari, *Pedagogy of Democracy: Feminism and the Cold War in the U.S. Occupation of Japan* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press, 2008).

¹⁷See the investigative-journalist accounts of Kobayashi Daijirō and Murase Akira, *Minna wa shiranai kokka baishun meirei*, new ed. (Tokyo: Yūzankaku Shuppan, 1992), 30; Mark Gayn, *Japan Diary* (Rutland, VT: Charles E. Tuttle Company, 1981), 232; and Kanzaki Kiyoshi, *Baishun: Ketteiban Kanzaki repooto* (Tokyo: Gendaishi shuppan-kai, 1974).

¹⁸Some studies have looked more closely at Japan's authorities' efforts to prepare for occupation after defeat, including Kentarō Awaya, *Gendaishi hakkutsu* (Tokyo: Otsukishoten, 1996); and Barak Kushner, *The Thought War: Japanese Imperial Propaganda* (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2006), 169–75.

¹⁹H. W. Allen, "Memorandum for Imperial Japanese Government: Abolition of Licensed Prostitution," 21 January 1946, SCAPIN-642, SCAP/GHQ, box 5250, sheet CIE(A)-01643, National Diet Library, Tokyo, Japan (hereafter NDL).

²⁰Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke, "Einleitung: Physische Gewalt—eine Kontinuität der Moderne," in *Physische Gewalt: Studien zur Geschichte der Neuzeit*, ed. Thomas Lindenberger and Alf Lüdtke (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1995), 7–38, 30.

²¹Kelly Askin has highlighted that sexual assaults involving soldiers (mostly during wartime) can take various forms but with "virtually always" male perpetrators on an international scale. Kelly Dawn Askin, *War Crimes against Women: Prosecution in International War Crimes Tribunals* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1997), 16.

²²Shani D'Cruze, "Approaching the History of Rape and Sexual Violence: Notes towards Research," *Women's History Review* 1, no. 3 (1992): 377–97; Joanna Bourke, *Rape: A History from the 1860s to the Present* (London: Virago, 2007); Renée J. Heberle and Victoria Grace, eds., *Theorizing Sexual Violence* (New York: Routledge, 2009); and Hazel Carby, *Reconstructing Womanhood: The Emergence of the Afro-American Woman Novelist* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1987), 18.

²³Cynthia Enloe, *Does Khaki Become You? The Militarization of Women's Lives* (London: Pandora Press, 1988), 19–21.

²⁴David Morgan, "Theatre of War: Combat, the Military, and Masculinities," in *Theorizing Masculinities*, ed. Harry Brod and Michael Kaufman (London: Sage Publishers, 1994), 165–82, 165; and Sandra Whitworth, *Men, Militarism, and UN Peacekeeping: A Gendered Analysis* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004). The term *militarized peace* is borrowed from Cynthia Enloe, *The Morning After: Sexual Politics at the End of the Cold War* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 144. Sarah Soh takes a similar position in *The Comfort Women: Sexual Violence and Postcolonial Memory in Korea and Japan* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008), xii.

²⁵Mary Louise Roberts, *What Soldiers Do: Sex and the American GI in World War II France* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013), 6–7.

²⁶R. W. Connel and James W. Messerschmidt, "Hegemonic Masculinity: Rethinking the Concept," *Gender & Society* 19, no. 6 (2005): 829–59, 844–45.

²⁷Cited in Hirofumi Hayashi, *Beigun bochi no rekishi: Sekai nettowaku no keisei to tenkai* (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2012), 152–53. In all accounts, the names of rape victims are usually blackened.

²⁸Duus, *Haisha no okurimono*, 78–79.

²⁹Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 118; and Duus, *Haisha no okurimono*, 79–80.

³⁰In Tokyo, for example, the Metropolitan Police Department documented fifteen to thirty cases a month in 1946, and the occupation army's provost marshal listed one to ten investigated cases a month for 1948 in the Tokyo-Yokohama area. Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 125; Elton K. McDonald, "Occupational History Report," 9 April 1948, Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Metropolitan Provost Marshal, Tokyo, Japan, RG 407, box 362, file 98-ASC5-0.3, Yokohama Command, Provost Marshal, 1948, National Archive and Record Administration, College Park, Maryland (hereafter NARA).

³¹Naimushō hoan kachō, "Beihei no fuhōkōi taisaku shiryō ni kansuru ken," in *Shiryō nihon gendaishi*, vol. 2, ed. Kentarō Awaya (Tokyo: Ōtsugi Shoten, 1980), 313.

³²Peter J. Katzenstein, *Cultural Norms and National Security: Police and Military in Postwar Japan* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 52; and Craig Parker, *The Japanese Police System Today: A Comparative Study* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2001).

³³Naimushō hoan kachō, "Beihei no fuhōkōi taisaku shiryō ni kansuru ken," 315.

³⁴"Beigun no mibun ke hō," *Asahi Shinbun*, September 4, 1945.

³⁵Central Liaison Office Tokyo (CLO), "From the Japanese Government to General Headquarters of the Allied Powers," 12 October 1945, no. 255, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, ed. Eiji Takemae (Tokyo: Miyoshi Shuppan, 1994), 576. Japanese administrators have already translated all reports submitted by the CLO to occupation authorities; the document collection *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho* contains only the contemporary English translations and omits the original reports in Japanese. Names and address details have been censored, and I added some small amount of information to make the reports more readable.

³⁶On racial profiling and the trope of the "Black Rapist," mostly in the context of US history, see Angela Y. Davis, "Rape, Racism, and the Myth of the Black Rapist," in *Women, Race, and Class* (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 172–201.

³⁷John G. Russell, "Race and Reflexivity: The Black Other in Contemporary Japanese Mass Culture," *Cultural Anthropology* 6, no. 1 (1991): 3–25, 6.

³⁸CLO, 19 September 1945, no. 40, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 90–101. In the CLO reports on rape, attempted rape, and sexual assault, all names, addresses, and personal descriptions except the reference age were blackened by members of the Diplomatic Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (*gaimushō gaibun shiryōkan*) during the editing process of the material in the 1970s.

³⁹CLO, 27 September 1945, no. 54, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 174–75.

⁴⁰Cited in Tsutomu Itsushima, *Kuroi Haru: Beigun, Panpan, onnatachi no sengo*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Tōgoshā, 1985), 256.

⁴¹For a possible criminal career in postwar Japan for US servicemen, see the life story of Nick Zappetti, who came to Japan on occupation duties but became a popular figure in postwar Japan's organized crime. Robert Whiting, *Tokyo Underworld: The Fast Times and Hard Life of an American Gangster in Japan* (New York: Vintage Books, 1999).

⁴²Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 122–23.

⁴³Naimushō hoan kachō, “Beihei no fuhōkōi taisaku shiryō ni kansuru ken,” 313–14.

⁴⁴Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 124.

⁴⁵Kovner, *Occupying Power*, 54.

⁴⁶Dower, *Embracing Defeat*, 412. Dower points out the ambivalence of the occupiers' censorship, which even prohibited its own naming as “censorship” because it would indicate a threat to such democratic values as the freedom of speech. The press code nevertheless encompassed all media between 1945 and 1949, and SCAP's Civil Censorship Detachment (CCD) within the Civil Intelligence & Information Section (CI&E) screened all Japanese print media, radio broadcasts, and film productions.

⁴⁷Naimushō hoan kachō, “Beihei no fuhōkōi taisaku shiryō ni kansuru ken,” 316–17. The Home Ministry already provided the English translations of the cited values.

⁴⁸Kanagawa-ken keisatsu-shi hensan iinkai, *Kanagawa-ken keisatsu-shi*, 347–48.

⁴⁹The one-dimensional regulation of prostitution has a longer, global history, in which police forces in various countries at different times usually protected the society from prostitutes but not the other way around; lower-class prostitutes could hardly ever rely on police security. Alain Corbin, *Women for Hire: Prostitution and Sexuality in France after 1850* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), 3–29; Barbara M. Hobson, *Uneasy Virtue: The Politics of Prostitution and the American Reform Tradition* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987), 139–64; Stephen Legg, “Stimulation, Segregation, and Scandal: Geographies of Prostitution Regulation in British India, between Registration (1888) and Suppression (1923),” *Modern Asian Studies* 46, no. 6 (2012): 1459–1505, 1462.

⁵⁰Keizai keisatsu buchō, “Ianhu nado no kyūjin chūihou ni kansuru keishichō keizaikei,” 6 October 1945, in *Nihon fujin mondai shiryō shūsei*, vol. 1, 544.

⁵¹Keishichō hoanka fūkikakari, “Shinchūgun kenpei ianjo junsatsuchi,” in *Nihon fujin mondai shiryō shūsei*, vol. 1, 543–44.

⁵²Susan Burns, "Bodies and Borders: Syphilis, Prostitution, and the Nation in Japan, 1860–1890," *U.S.-Japan Women's Journal* (English supplement), no. 15 (1998): 3–30, 9. On the sex trade and its terminology in the Tokugawa period, see Amy Stanley, *Selling Women: Prostitution, Markets, and the Household in Early Modern Japan* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012).

⁵³CLO, 10 October 1945, no. 229, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 486.

⁵⁴CLO, 13 October 1945, no. 253, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 568.

⁵⁵CLO, 19 September 1945, no. 40, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 94, 96, 99.

⁵⁶*Ibid.*, 484.

⁵⁷Tanaka, *Japan's Comfort Women*, 128.

⁵⁸Christopher Aldous, *The Police in Occupation Japan: Control, Corruption, and Resistance to Reform* (London: Routledge, 1997), 69, 85–86.

⁵⁹"Hikaeyo fujoshi no hitori aruki: fushidarana fukusō wa tsutsushimō," *Yomiuri Hōchi*, August 23, 1945.

⁶⁰Naimushō hoan kachō, "Beihei no fuhōkōi taisaku shiryō ni kansuru ken," 515.

⁶¹CLO, 13 October 1945, no. 253, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 568.

⁶²*Ibid.*

⁶³CLO, 19 September 1945, no. 40, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 96.

⁶⁴*Ibid.*, 101.

⁶⁵CLO, 12 October 1945, no. 255, in *GHQ e no nihonseifu taiō bunsho*, vol. 1, 576–77.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 577.

⁶⁷D'Cruze, "Approaching the History of Rape and Sexual Violence," 390.

⁶⁸Terese Svoboda, "U.S. Courts-Martial in Occupation Japan: Rape, Race, and Censorship," *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 7, no. 1 (2009) 1–11; and Askin, *War Crimes against Women*, xvi.

⁶⁹The mechanism of multiple violations of rape victims has also been highlighted in the case of wartime comfort women, who were integrated into a narrative of national victimhood at the hands of Japanese colonial aggression, but their experiences were and still are silenced in a cloak of (national) shame. See Chizuko Ueno, *Nationalism and Gender* (Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 2004), 69–75. A similar argument is made by Atina Grossmann, who shows how, in the case of defeated Germany in 1945, the image of German women mass raped by soldiers of the Red Army confirmed a postwar German identity of victimhood. Atina Grossmann, "A

Question of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers," *October* 72 (Spring 1995): 42–63, 49.

⁷⁰Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, "Can the Subaltern Speak?" in *Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture*, ed. Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1988), 271–313, 281.

⁷¹John Dower, "Preface," in Eiji Takemae, *Inside GHQ: The Allied Occupation of Japan* (New York: Continuum, 2002), xix–xxiv, xxi; and Takemae, *Inside GHQ*, xxvi.

⁷²Liz Kelly, "Wars against Women: Sexual Violence, Sexual Politics, and the Militarized State," in *States of Conflict: Gender, Violence, and Resistance*, ed. Susie Jacobs, Ruth Jacobson, and Jennifer Marchbank (New York: Zed Books, 2000), 45–65, 48.
